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 3 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 required developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions. It did, however, not bear much fruit because the world’s biggest polluter, the 
United States (US), did not ratify the treaty. In 2015, almost 20 years later, a breakthrough 
occurred when 196 member-states signed the Paris Agreement and pledged action against 
climate change. China, who has surpassed US in greenhouse gas emissions for some time now, 
has already ratified the agreement and has repeated its commitment even after the Trump 
administration withdrew just last week (Hua, 2017). Moreover, the PRC has unilaterally 
announced a 3 billion USD investment for the China South-South Climate Cooperation Fund. 
With this, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is taking on a leadership role in helping 
developing countries combat climate change. Due to China’s uncooperative attitude and rigid 
position during earlier climate conferences – in particular during the 2009 Copenhagen 
Climate Conference – the international community was surprised by its proactive 
commitments and diplomatic behavior during the Paris negotiations (Hilton & Kerr, 2016, 
p.48). Paul G. Harris (2011, p.1) wrote that the Copenhagen conference revealed that in the 
international management of climate change, all value was placed on the national interests of 
the member states. It was not in the interest of the PRC to cooperate and therefore it did not. 
This refers to rationalist thinking in terms of cost-benefit analysis. But what if it is not just 
about cost-benefit analysis? Why has China changed his behavior in relation to climate 
change when it was apparently against their interest to cooperate? And what are the causal 
mechanisms behind this shift in policy and attitude? The following research question will be 
answered in this thesis:  
 
“To what extent can norm diffusion explain China’s change in environmental policies 
and attitudes towards international cooperation in combatting climate change, measured 
from COP-15 in Copenhagen to COP-21 in Paris?” 
 
In this thesis I will show that China has been influenced by the norm on international 
cooperation in tackling climate change. This thesis adds to the theoretical debate between 
rationalist cost-benefit analysis and norm diffusion and norm localization. I will also show 
that in some respect internalization of a foreign norm can be serving a state’s self-interest. 
The three concepts are therefore not mutually exclusive, but, rather, supporting entities. The 
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real-world implications of this research are a deeper understanding of the PRC’s standpoint 
on climate change and thus compliance behavior. By analyzing China’s shifting position 
towards constructive engagement at the COP-21 in Paris, policy makers and representatives 
of other states during climate conferences will better comprehend China’s intentions. 
Understanding this key player will help with negotiations processes and implementation 
processes and can help predict behavior and possible breaking points.  
I have conducted a discourse analysis of Chinese newspaper articles published around 
the COP-15 in Copenhagen en COP-21 in Paris to show that international cooperation in 
tackling climate change is gaining importance by the PRC. Moreover, I have used data on 
compliance to commitments made during several climate summits to show that not only the 
rhetoric has changed, but policy as well.  
I will show that the PRC, via several mechanisms, is internalizing and localizing the 
international – and initially ‘foreign and hostile’ – norm. By numerous international 
consultations, high-level meetings and participation in international organizations (IOs), 
environmental protection has now become policy. By the power of domestic pressure groups 
and the strategic choice of the central government to align the norm with domestic objectives, 
green growth has now become a core value of the development agenda. Moreover, the strong 
sense of self has caused the PRC to not only become a participant, but also assume a 
leadership role in the global response to climate change.  
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THEORATICAL FRAMEWORK  
AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
International cooperation from a rational cost-benefit perspective  
Although no one denies that international cooperation is possible, political scientists differ as 
to the likelihood of its occurrence and the ease of cooperation (Baldwin, 1993, p.5). Checkel 
(2001, p.559) writes that for rationalists the compliance of states can be traced back to 
coercion (sometimes), instrumental cost-benefit calculations (always), and possibly social 
incentives. Agents calculate their response on a cost-benefit ratio and assess whether the 
benefits (material, social or both) outweigh the costs of sanctions, (security) threats or losing 
reputation (Checkel, 2001, p.544).  
When writing about cooperation on environmental protection, ‘The Tragedy of the 
Commons’ by Hardin (1968) cannot go unmentioned. In his article the author uses an analogy 
of sheep and herdsmen in a meadow to highlight the difficulty of protecting non-excludable 
(‘common’) goods. Every rational actor would increase its stock to maximize the output, 
because individual gains outweigh common costs. However, eventually the system crashes, 
the quality of the stock deteriorates and all the herdsmen are worse off than they did before 
increasing the livestock (Maclean, 2015, p.227). Hardin (1968, p.1247) proposed to solve this 
problem either by changing the structure and privatizing the commons, or by ‘mutual coercion 
mutually agreed upon’: adopting some authority to regulate grazing policies. ‘Some authority’ 
could be the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
Neorealist scholars attach importance to relative gains when assessing cooperation in 
different fields, such as climate change (Hodgson, 2011, p.4). Because in most cases 
environmental protection would not be classified as a military-security issue, cooperation 
could take place under absolute gains benefits analysis (Lipson, 1984, p.15-18). But what if 
there is no material benefit to states’ cooperation on climate change? Grundig (2006) 
researched patterns of cooperation in the issues areas of ozone depletion, global warming and 
trade. The benefits of the first two issue areas are non-excludable goods and have enormous 
implementation costs. Moreover, states can easily benefit without cooperating and it is 
difficult to punish defectors. However, as Hodgson (2011, p.4) argues, Grundig’s analysis 
does not explain why in some cases states do find consensus on environmental issues and sign 
agreements. The Kyoto Protocol is a clear example: even though the Bush administration 
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“defected”, this did not result in other countries withdrawing their support (and compliance) 
for the Kyoto Protocol, even though this would be the rational response.  
In short, not all actors adhere to rules imposed by ‘mutually agreed on coercive’ 
institutions such as the UNFCCC. Moreover, not all decisions are made on a cost-benefti 
basis. These are insufficient explanations for changes in behavior. It is therefore important to 
look at other explanations. 
 
Norm diffusion  
Norms are “collectively held ideas about behavior such that unlike ideas which may be held 
privately, norms are shared and social: they are not just subjective but intersubjective” 
[emphasis in original] (Finnemore, 1996, p.23). Within every specific society, state or region 
these collectively held ideas on behavior exist. Accordingly, the norm is not rigid, but also 
malleable by agents in the particular context (Oh & Matsuoka, 2013, p.4).  
In essence, the transnational process of norm diffusion influences domestic decision-
making. If the process is strong enough, the norms will become the only appropriate type of 
behavior. At this point the norm is ‘internalized’ (Gilardi in: Carlsnaes et al., 2012, pp.453-
475). There are several ways in which norm diffusion can take place: 
Firstly, some authors argue that norms can be taught. Finnemore (1993) writes on 
norm diffusion by IOs, specifically the United National Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO). She belongs to what Acharya (2004, p.242) calls “the moral 
cosmopolitans” that make up the first wave scholarship on normative change and norm 
diffusion. Finnemore (1993) argues that UNESCO diffused the norm of states’ responsibility 
for science to other states where local conditions would not have prompted these demands at 
that time.  
Secondly, some scholars stress the role of domestic variables. Moral cosmopolitans 
downplay the role of the actor and view norm diffusion as primarily being taught by (and due 
to the power of) transnational agents. The unaddressed black box is how actors are persuaded 
to internalize the norm: “this learning is asocial and devoid of interaction” (Checkel, 2001, 
p.561). The second wave scholarship of scholars on norm diffusion focused on the observed 
divergence of norm diffusion rate (Oh & Matsuoka, 2013, p.4). The stress was put upon the 
“degree of fit” between existing, domestic norms and organizational/political institutions and 
transnational norms. It emphasized the role of domestic context (political, organizational and 
cultural) of the agents in conditioning the new norm (Acharya, 2004, p.243).  
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Checkel (2001, pp.562-563) proposes five hypotheses under which circumstances 
agents should be particularly open to preference change. Firstly, the agent is in a new and 
uncertain environment. Secondly, the agent has few cognitive priors that are inconsistent with 
the new norm. Thirdly, the norm-maker is a powerful member of the in-group to which the 
agent wants to belong/belongs. Fourthly, lecturing or demanding is less effective than ‘acts 
out principles of serious deliberative argument’. Lastly, the subject should not be too 
politicized.  
The third manner in which norm diffusion can take place is initiation by domestic 
demand. A security of economic crisis may be a catalyst for a need to revise ‘the rules of the 
game’. Another possibility is that local actors want to legitimize their authority after domestic 
political changes. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p.893) state that the existence of ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ is a common phenomenon in norm diffusion: “domestic “norm entrepreneurs” 
advocating a minority position use international norms to strengthen their position in 
domestic debates”. Finally, pressure by societal groups could also prompt the demand for 
new norms (Acharya, 2004, p.247).  
Moreover, it is important to note that the arguments on whether behavior is norm-
based or interest-based miss an essential element of the equation: norm internalization can 
often be self-interested, based on the specification of the nature of the norm and the interests 
of the actor (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p.912).  
 
Norm localization  
Logically, not all norms find fertile soil in other states. Besides the domestic context possibly 
not being a perfect fit for the norm, the norm can also be an imperfect fit for the domestic 
context. In his article, Acharya (2004) writes about norm localization: one shape that norm 
diffusion can take. He defines localization as “the active construction (through discourse, 
framing, grafting and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the 
former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices” (Acharya, 2004, 
p.245).  
There are several factors that favor localization. Firstly, the localization of norms can 
have a positive effect on the legitimacy of local actors. The actors can enhance their authority 
and ‘borrow’ legitimacy from international norms, while ingraining them with local norms, 
leaving the latter dominant.  
Secondly, another influential factor is the existence of strong, local norms. If the local 
norms are foundational or inherent to a group for multiple generations, the likelihood 
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increases that the norm cannot be transferred wholly, but rather will be localized by the norm-
takers.  
Thirdly, the before mentioned domestic ‘norm entrepreneurs’ can play an essential 
role. They have to be perceived as upholding local identity and values, as opposed to being an 
outside force (in Chinese discourse: ‘foreign hostile forces’).  
A fourth condition favoring localization is the norm-takers’ sense of identity. If the 
norm-taker sees itself as being unique in its position in the international field, values and 
identity, an international norm would rather be localized than adopted wholly (Acharya, 2004, 
pp.247-249).  
In conclusion, the concept of localization helps in understanding why particular norms 
are rejected and others accepted as well as the degree to which norms are internalized by 
given actors (Acharya, 2004, p.269). This author researched the topic of norm localization in 
regional setting, I, however, will use his analysis of norm localization on the domestic context 
of the PRC.  
 
Environmental protection and China 
In the 20
th
 century the Chinese leadership viewed environmental degradation as a necessary 
evil to increase economic growth and alleviate large-scale poverty (Li, 2016, p.49). In the 
Mao era, the environment was viewed as something to be exploited for economic growth 
rather than protected. When the communist ideology was losing ground, the Chinese public’s 
tolerance for environment related problems started to decrease as well. As a result of putting 
the economy above environmental protection, the PRC is currently the largest national emitter 
of greenhouse gas (Harris, 2011, p.XI). Nationally, the PRC faces a multitude of climate 
change-induced disasters and therefore a shift to a green growth path is necessary for energy 
security, environmental quality and long-term economic growth (Li & Wang, 2011, p.519). 
However, until less than a decade ago, China persistently advocated that it had the right to 
reject internationally binding limits on Green House Gas (GHG) emissions in order to 
develop (Harris, 2011, p.2). This point of view was particularly clear during the Copenhagen 
Accord negotiations (Shambaugh, 2013, p.153). However, recently the PRC has been 
proactive in bilateral and even multilateral settings and climate negotiations. In Figure A the 
shift in focus is exemplified. Every fifth year the PRC adjusts its socio-economic 
development policies and targets in a Five-Year Plan (FYP). The targets are classified as 
either mandatory or expected. Mandatory indicates that the target is compulsory and must be 
achieved within the time restrictions of the FYP period. Expected show an indicative 
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development orientation and is non-binding in nature. In the 11
th
 FYP (2006-2010) fewer 
targets are set in general and most are classified as ‘expected’. In the 12th FYP (2011-2016) 
most environment-related targets are set and nearly all are classified as ‘mandatory’ (Li & 
Wang, 2012, p.52).  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A: Comparison of socioeconomic environmental targets in the 11
th
 and 12
th
 FYP (Li & 
Wang, 2012, p.521).  
 
On the reasoning behind this change, scholars have not found consensus. However, the 
majority of the prevalent visions on China’s environmental policies can be placed in the 
sphere of realist thinking and cost-benefit analysis. The main visions are outlined below.  
Firstly, an important question is: who does protect the environment? One study by 
Bernauer and Böhmelt (2013) tackled the assumption that welfare states – perceived as 
milder, kinder and more social – are leading in environmental protection. They argued that 
this assumption is based on a spurious correlation: some welfare states spend more, because 
they have more, not because ‘they care more’. They have, however, found statistical 
significance for the effect of the degree of openness towards the international system on 
environmental performance (Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013, p.11998). This is evidence for norm 
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diffusion. Moreover, Bernauer (2013, p.434) stated that, because (social) democracy 
apparently has a non-effect on GHG emissions, other state characteristics should be 
investigated. He puts forward that socioeconomic factors, such as income levels, population 
density and industrial structure, are more important to determine levels of environmental 
protection. Simply put: domestic context matters.  
Hilton and Kerr (2016) stress that the structure of the Chinese domestic economy is a 
key explanatory variable for China’s more positive participation in international climate 
change negotiations. The authors (2016, p.51) write that the Chinese leadership has already 
for a long time recognized the fact that the country’s economic growth was unsustainable, 
both in environmental and economic terms. In the Twelfth FYP in 2011 (PRC, 2011) it 
became clear that China has started to restructure its economy and to gradually shift away 
from industry and manufacturing. Hilton and Kerr (2016, p.51) call this the ‘New Normal’ 
economy. The new policies have a radical shift in economic policy explicitly linked to the 
tackling climate change. With a move up the value chain and a shift from the production to 
service sector, less waste in energy and resources will take place.  
A large number of authors (for example: Wang, 2016, Li & Wang, 2011, Torney, 
2012) stress that an important factor driving Chinese environmental policies is the strategic 
desire to be energy independent. Wang (2016) proposes the ‘strategic localization’ model in 
relation to China’s progressive environmental policies. She argues that the PRC strategically 
localized the norm of international cooperation on tackling climate change, based purely on 
the need for energy security and furthering the economic transition (2016, p.4). The author 
used the G20 Compliance Reports to conclude that China only complies in the field of clean 
energy technology development. However, this does not paint a full picture. She does not 
account for the partial compliance in the issue area of tackling climate change, nor the 
leadership role China assumes in climate conferences.  
Torney (2012, p.15) argues that transnational norms are important and being diffused 
to China. The perceived need to enhance China’s international legitimacy requires developing 
climate change policies. The Chinese leadership wants to show its intention of a ‘peaceful 
rise’1, increase its soft power and show the international community that China can be a 
responsible member.  
Moreover, there is a growing awareness of China’s deteriorating environmental 
quality. Air pollution, water pollution and desertification are significantly decreasing the 
                                                        
1
 Or ‘China’s peaceful development’. This refers to the official policy by former Party Leader Hu 
Jintao that was implemented to rebut the ‘China treat theory’. In Chinese: 中国和平崛起  
 11 
livelihood of Chinese citizens. This situation is acknowledged and recognized by the Chinese 
leadership (Torney, 2012, p.14). However, this is a domestic problem and cooperation in 
international setting is therefore not necessarily required.  
 
Contributions 
This thesis makes several contributions to the above-mentioned literature. Firstly, I shall 
highlight norm localization in a domestic setting, as opposed to the regional setting in 
Acharya’s work. Secondly, the majority of scholars view China’s new environmental policies 
from a cost-benefit analysis point of view. I will show that China is to some extent adopting 
the norm while there is no material benefit. Moreover, I will show that cost-benefit analysis, 
norm diffusion and norm localization are, in the case of China, non-excludable entities. I shall 
show that neither explanation can fully account for the changes in policy and attitude, but that 
they all have merit. Lastly, this research will give policymakers and non-state actors deeper 
insight in climate policy decision-making and compliance behavior of the PRC.  
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METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In this thesis the change in behavior and attitudes by the Chinese government in tackling 
climate change will be researched. My research question is:  
 
“To what extent can norm diffusion explain China’s change in environmental policies 
and attitudes towards international cooperation in combatting climate change, measured 
from COP-15 in Copenhagen to COP-21 in Paris?” 
 
In this thesis I will take a deductive approach. This entails testing the relationship 
between theory and data (Bryman, 2001, p.48). I am going to research whether the 
hypothesized causal relationship between international norms and diffusion of norms into 
other contexts holds when we look at the case of China and environmental protection. When 
the research question entails ‘why’ or how’, case studies should be considered the preferred 
strategy. I do not have any control over the events that I research, because the focus is on a 
“contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context”, and therefore the explanatory 
research design is most suited (Yin, 1994, p.1). Moreover, Schramm (1971, p.6) writes on 
case studies that ‘the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to 
illuminate a decision or a set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, 
and with what result”. This is what I will do as well: analyze the shift in policy and the 
reasons behind the shift.  
 
Conceptualization and variables 
The transnational norm that I research has been established by climate negotiators through the 
creation of the UNFCCC in the early 1990s. The norm entails that it is ‘good’ behavior for 
states to engage in international cooperation on tackling climate change (Falkner, 2016, 
p.1110). This norm on climate protection is the independent variable in my thesis. My 
dependent variable is the behavior (actions) and views of the Chinese government. Simply 
put, how (if at all) did the international norm affect the way the PRC views environmental 
protection?  
 To determine whether norm diffusion and norm localization are the reasons for the 
change in Chinese environmental policies, firstly several Chinese norms on international 
coopering need to be identified. I have identified three:  
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The Chinese government (defined as the government of the PRC, also referred to as 
‘Mainland China’ and, thus, excluding Taiwan, Macao en Hong Kong) 2  consistently 
emphasizes that non-interference in the domestic affairs of states and deep respect for state 
sovereignty embodies the cornerstone of collective action (Prantl & Nakano, 2011, p.9). This 
is best done in bilateral agreements. Although the PRC still upholds the nurturing of bilateral 
relations as the preferred strategy in international relations, the state is increasingly active in 
multilateral institutions. With China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001 the norm started to alter (Womack, 2010, p.223). China is now a member of the African 
Development Bank, the G20, G77, World Health Organization and the ASEAN +3, among 
others. We can assume that the norm has been diffused, when China is giving up part of its 
sovereignty by participating in environmental IOs. This norm diffusion will have taken place 
by the manner of social learning: long-term contact with IOs will ‘teach’ the PRC the initially 
foreign norm of international cooperation.   
Another important Chinese norm on international cooperation is “a practice of 
asymmetric international relationships based on an ideology of mutual benefit and practice of 
negotiations based on acknowledgement of the autonomy of smaller partners” (Womack, 
2010, p.20). This can be traced back to the traditional tribute system, where China requested 
from states deference to a Sinitic order and not necessarily a specific gain. The tribute states, 
in turn, received an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of their rule and the implicit 
guarantee of sovereignty and non-interference by China. Moreover, from this angle the 
‘building blocks’ of international relations are assumed to be bilateral relationships between 
states of unequal status (Womack, 2010, pp.25-27). To conclude, we can establish that China 
has localized the norm on international cooperation in tackling climate change, if China is 
assuming a leadership role (based on unequal relationships). This norm localization will have 
taken place because of the strong local norm of (regional) leadership. Moreover, China has an 
extremely strong sense of self-identity. The norm can therefore not be accepted wholly.  
Thirdly, in the post-Mao era, during the market-oriented economic reform, the Chinese 
Communist Party quickly witnessed a widespread demise in support and communist ideology. 
Moreover, the basis of legitimacy of the CCP was eroding and Chinese intellectuals started 
pointing to other possible forms of state organization: Western-style democracy, for instance. 
                                                        
2
 The government of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are two different entities. 
However, they are highly intertwined. To illustrate this: Xi Jinping is on the one hand the President of 
the PRC and on the other hand the General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of both Military 
Commissions. The CCP decides on policy, which will be implemented by the state. Hence, I will use 
both terms alternately, but will always be referring to official policy lines.  
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In reaction to this, the CCP secured its legitimacy by intertwining it with the state’s economic 
success. Because political reform would cause the country to collapse into chaos and turmoil, 
first the economy would be restructured to build a harmonious and prosperous China under 
the strong leadership of the CCP (Zhao, 2016, pp.1168-1169). Currently, communist ideology 
is no longer the foundation for political legitimacy, but economic growth is (Joseph, 2010, 
p.21). The norm has been diffused to the PRC if it places the protection of the environment 
above economic growth. This norm diffusion will take place in two steps: firstly, domestic 
societal groups will function as norm entrepreneurs and advocate norm adoption. Secondly, 
the PRC will have strategically chosen to internalize the norm based on self-interest. The PRC 
will align domestic objectives, such as increasing legitimacy by providing opportunities for 
green growth and thus increasing economic growth, with the international norm and domestic 
pressures.  
 
Methods 
The reason why I have decided to research the policy shift between these specific two 
summits is because they are the exemplary for the shift in China’s behavior vis-à-vis 
international cooperation on environmental protection. To quote a famous article from The 
Guardian on China’s behavior during the Copenhagen Conference: “Copenhagen was a 
disaster (…). But the truth about what actually happened is in danger of being lost (…). The 
truth is this: China wrecked the talks (…). How do I know this? Because I was in the room 
and saw it happen” (Lynas, 2009). After the Paris Agreement, China was lauded for its 
positive participation and named as one of the main contributors to the successful outcome 
(Hilton & Kerr, 2016, p.48).  
I performed a discourse analysis to show how the rhetoric by the PRC changed in 
relation to international cooperation on climate change. I examined articles published by the 
state press bureau Xinhua news. I used the database Factiva
3
 to find articles published during 
the UNFCCC climate conferences of Copenhagen (2009) and Paris (2015).  
 
 
 
                                                        
3 https://global.factiva.com/ is accessible via the Leiden University online catalogue. I searched for 
articles marked ‘environmental news’ that contained “哥本哈根” (Copenhagen) and were published 
between 01-12-2009 and 25-12-2009 (one week before and after the conference) by Xinhua News 
Agency in simplified Chinese. Then I searched for environmental news containing “巴黎” (Paris) that 
was published between 22-11-2015 and 21-12-2015 by Xinhua News Agency in simplified Chinese.  
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Figure B. Overview of articles used for the discourse analysis.  
 
China’s policy making has a rather opaque nature. In policy-making processes many 
actors exert influence, such as (local) government branches, ministries and government-
affiliated bodies. Moreover, political and economic interests in China are highly intertwined, 
because of high-ranked CCP members owning and working at state-owned enterprises (SEOs) 
(Helleiner and Kirshner, 2014, p.16). This particular domestic context creates a ‘black box’ of 
Chinese policy making that is difficult to untangle.   
I have therefore chosen to focus mainly on press releases by the state press bureau 
Xinhua News Agency to deduct the standpoint of the Chinese political leadership on 
environmental reform. The articles are aimed at a larger and more general audience and are, 
therefore, more likely to represent broader government attitudes (Olczak, 2016, p.13). 
Moreover, the articles I have analyzed are in Mandarin Chinese
4
 and are, thus, less intended 
for an international audience – or to please an international audience. Lastly, Xinhua is “the 
most loyal political and ideological instrument of the CCP and the world’s largest 
propaganda machine” and the news agency has been, since it was founded in 1931, the 
‘mouthpiece’ of the CCP (Hong, 2011, pp.378-382). For all these reasons I have chosen the 
analyze articles by Xinhua and not another Chinese news agency.  
To support the conclusions I have drawn, I have used other sources. Firstly, since the 
1990s, the State Council of the PRC (the executive branch) has published White Papers to 
inform the global and national public on official policy stand and government objectives. The 
articles are available in English and therefore also meant for non-Chinese nationals. With the 
                                                        
4
 All translations are my own and can be referred to in the appendix.  
 
 
2009 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen (COP-15).  
Date: 07-12-2009 – 18-12-2009 
Before COP-15: Xinhua 1 (07-12-2009) 
‘Developed countries should ‘pay the bill’ 
for climate change’ 
After COP-15: Xinhua 2 (23-12-2009) 
‘The international community continues to 
follow with interest the Copenhagen Climate 
Conference and ‘Copenhagen Agreement’’  
 
 
2015 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Paris (COP-21). 
Date: 30-11-2015 – 12-12-2015 
Before COP-21: Xinhua 3 (29-11-2015) 
‘The international community praises China 
for its efforts in answering to climate 
change’ 
After COP-21: Xinhua 4 (14-12-2015) 
‘China’s wisdom and strength behind the 
Paris Agreement’ 
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limitation for using Xinhua News being its status as propaganda machine, the limitation for 
using White Papers is that it might be written to please to international community. Secondly, 
since 1953, China publishes FYPs. These FYPs show the official policy line and shift in focus 
per five years. I will use the 11
th
 FYP (2006-2010), 12
th
 FYP (2011-2015) and 13
th
 FYP 
(2016-2020). The limitation of using the FYPs is that they only show official policy line. 
Because of non-emotional and official language in the FYPs and the restriction of certain 
topics, FYPs alone are not enough for my research. The last limitation of these other sources 
is that they were not published during the same time as COP-15 and COP-21. As the research 
topic is the policy shift, the other sources will not show the starting point or endpoint, but 
progress in between. Lastly, the limitation for the speech of President Xi is that it is meant to 
please the international audience as well.  
Secondly, to analyze the actual compliance by the PRC, I used the G20 Compliance 
reports on environmental protection by the G20 Research group of the University of Toronto
5
. 
The reason I use the G20 commitments to analyze the level of cooperation of China is 
because during the G20 summits statements were made that reiterated the groups of countries’ 
commitment to the agreed outcomes of the previous UNFCCC summit. Therefore, the 
compliance of states to commitments made during the G20 summits and to the UNFCCC 
conferences is measured. I use this dataset to analyze whether the PRC only makes verbal 
(and ‘hollow’) commitments or truly follows up.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5
 http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/index.html#commitments 
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
 
To analyze whether the shift in policy and attitudes towards international cooperation on 
climate change can be attributed to norm diffusion, I have stated three criteria. Firstly, the 
shift will be established per criterion and after this the causal mechanisms by which the norm 
has been diffused shall be described.  
 
Participating in international organizations   
The first criterion for analyzing the extent of norm diffusion is whether China is giving up 
part of its sovereignty to engage in IOs to tackle climate change.  
In the Copenhagen articles a lot of emphasis is put on whose responsibility it is to 
solve the climate change issue. Authorities are cited that the responsibility should be placed 
on the shoulders of the polluters: “De Boer [UNFCCC Executive Secretary in 2009] explicitly 
mentioned the names of the European Union, Japan and the USA, (…) they do not only have 
the responsibility to respond to climate change, but also have more capability in providing 
funds in comparison with the vast majority of developing countries” (Xinhua 1, 2009). It is 
clear that the norm brought up a lot of resistance. In the set of articles on Paris it is not 
mentioned that the developed countries have initiated modern-day climate change. It is, 
however, still multiple times stressed that the international community should adhere to the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’. This means that ‘states have common 
responsibilities to protect the environment and promote sustainable development, but because 
of different social, economic and ecological situations, countries must shoulder different 
responsibilities” (Ladly, 2011, p.65). This principle acknowledges the shared obligation, but 
denies equal responsibility. The importance China gives this principle is also reiterated 
multiple times in the 12
th
 and 13
th
 FYPs (PRC, 2011, pp.29-30) (PRC, 2016, pp.136-138).  
The next topic in the discourse analysis is the differentiation between developed and 
developing countries. In Xinhua 1 (2009) it is stressed that the demand to develop is a 
“legitimate” demand by poor countries and that the developed world should realize this. In 
addition to this, strong language is used to describe the behavior of developed countries: 
“[developed countries] attempt to make countries in development covertly “pay the bill” for 
climate change” and “but in reality, when money needs to be taken out, yet all are bashful, 
and continuously they have not taken out funding programs that make the international 
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community feel satisfied” (Xinhua 1, 2009). This illustrates that the PRC was significantly fed 
up with developed countries’ behavior.  
In the period leading up to the Copenhagen summit, in particular the EU pushed for 
measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) requirements to apply to commitments made 
by developing and developed countries (Torney, 2016, p.133). The Chinese negotiators 
resisted binding emission targets and international checking, because it was a possible 
constraint on development (Hilton & Kerr, 2016, p.50). The international engagement did not 
succeed in changing the position of the PRC. However, during the Paris agreement China was 
willing to commit and agreed, for the first time, that the emission reductions would be subject 
to MRV (Hilton & Kerr, 2016, p.50). This action indicates that China is giving up sovereignty 
and accepting intervention from the international community. This change in stand is also 
visible in the discourse. A critical statement from 2015 read: “The developed countries, even 
though they put forward the commitment until 2020 to annually provide 100 billion USD for 
countries in development (…) currently there still exists a huge gap between promises and 
implementation (…) funding issues will be the main issue” (Xinhua 3, 2015). The current 
behavior is still not acceptable for the PRC, but there is a much softer tone used and it is 
immediately mentioned that the problems can be overcome during negotiations.  
Another change in discourse is China’s view on international cooperation. Every time 
international cooperation is mentioned in the Xinhua 1 and 2 (2009), words that stress the 
difficulty are used: “through rough negotiations” and “through hard consultation and 
collaboration, by all parties, finally” (Xinhua 2, 2009) [emphasis added]. This shows that the 
norm on international cooperation on tackling climate change brought up a lot of resistance by 
the PRC. In the articles on the Paris Agreement, there is increased mentioning of how the 
international community should work together to tackle climate change. Not only is increased 
and tighter cooperation advocated, China is also prescribing how this cooperation should take 
place. Moreover, China is besides participating in IOs, also funding them (Xinhua 3, 2015). 
Lastly, president Xi stated in his speech during the opening session of the Paris summit:  
 
“We should create a future of win-win cooperation, with each country making 
contribution to the best of its ability. For global issues, like climate change, a take-more-give-
less approach based on expediency is in nobody’s interest. The Paris Conference should reject 
the narrow-minded mentality of “zero sum game” and call on all countries, the developed in 
particular, to assume more shared responsibilities for win-win outcomes” (Xi, 2015).  
 
There are two other indicators that show that China is increasingly becoming active in 
international organizations and adopting the norm. Firstly, during the Copenhagen summit 
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China had successfully resisted international pressures to pledge to a peaking year for global 
and domestic emissions (Torney, 2016, p.112). In November 2014, there was a significant 
development when president Xi announced, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
summit in Beijing, the intention to peak GHB emissions ‘around 2030’ (Torney, 2016, p.128). 
Secondly, in the compliance reports on commitments made during G20 summits, it is stated 
that China complies better to climate commitments with UNFCCC reference (Warren, 2016, 
p.4). This shows that China is adopting the norm and attaches importance to the UNFCCC.  
The causal mechanism by which this shift took place is normative diffusion by social 
learning. Torney (2012; 2016) has interviewed high-level PRC officials and they stated that 
because foreign leaders repeatedly had climate change so high on the agenda when they met 
Chinese leaders, it became a national priority. Because of the level of centralization of the 
PRC, high-level international dialogue is of significant influence on policy. After the 
Copenhagen summit the EU started placing their international relationship with China on a 
more secure, institutionalized political footing by upgrading climate change talks to a 
ministerial level (Torney, 2016, p.112). Moreover, the frequency of climate related summits 
and the quantity increased: for example, in 2009 the G8 group altered itself to the G20 and 
annual meetings occurred from then onwards with the PRC as full member.  
In conclusion, the first criterion is met. China has increasingly become active in IOs 
and is giving up sovereignty to combat climate change.   
 
Leadership role in international cooperation  
The second criterion is whether China has localized the norm by assuming a leadership 
position in international cooperation on climate change. 
In the Xinhua articles a lot of time is spend on China’s actions. However, the parts in 
the Xinhua articles on Copenhagen that I have highlighted with ‘China’s actions on tackling 
climate change’ all express non-binding commitments and encouragements. For example: 
“The greenhouse gas reduction objective that China declared is a ‘very ambitious objective’” 
and “China brought up proactive carbon reduction goals” (Xinhua 2, 2009). In the second set 
of articles, more is written on China’s actions and actual investment plans are mentioned. “In 
2030, CO2 emissions in comparison to 2005 will have decreased ranging from 60% to 65%, 
non-fossil energy resources take up a proportion of approximately 20% in primary energy 
consumption” (Xinhua 4, 2015). This same difference can be witnessed in the FYPS. In the 
12
th
 FYP most energy, environmental and climate targets have been classified as mandates 
and therefore indicate the central government’s determination in answering to climate change 
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(Li & Wang, 2012, p.520). In the 11
th
 FYP the climate related topic was only classified as an 
objective and (purposely) vague (World Bank, 2008, p.7).   
This relates to another distinct topic in the articles: how China is viewed by the 
international community. In the first set of articles a lot of emphasis is put on how unfairly 
China is treated and viewed, naturally making international cooperation more difficult. “In 
response to the remarks from a few days ago in relation to China ‘hijacking’ the process of 
negotiations from the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference” and “it is not fair to point to 
China” (Xinhua 2, 2009). In the articles on the Paris Agreement is becomes clear that China is 
positioning itself as a leader of the developing countries – and to a lesser extent the world – in 
the fight against climate change: “China is using its own practical actions to support 
developing countries to raise their capabilities in answering to climate change” (Xinhua 4, 
2015). Moreover, China is positioning itself next to hegemon US: “President Xi Jinping also 
called with president Obama of the US and expressed the strong political desire to reach 
agreements” (Xinhua 4, 2015). In the 2008 environmental White Paper of 2008, China 
“actively participated in” and “is an official member of”” international cooperation on climate 
change (State Council of the PRC, 2008). In the 2013 White Paper the assumed leadership 
role becomes clear as specific paths are laid our for cooperation with different groups of 
countries and the specific actions initiated by China are mentioned: “[China] offered 
technology training to professionals from developing countries”, “organized and attended” 
meetings of multilateral institutions (State Council of the PRC, 2013). The fact that these 
plans are laid out per country group also indicates the wish of the PRC to have relationships 
based on unequal status: not only unequal in relation to the PRC, but also unequal in relation 
to other country groups. Lastly, it is constantly expressed in Xinhua 3 and 4 (2015) how 
China is ‘praised’ by authoritative figures and the international community for its cooperative 
attitude.  
The causal mechanism by which this norm diffusion took place is norm localization. 
China has an extremely strong sense of self-identity (Torney, 2016, p.136) and has strong 
local norms, such as the practice of asymmetric international relationships, that are 
foundational to the group. The norm on international cooperation in combatting climate 
change was an imperfect fit for the domestic context of China. An active process started and 
the norm was molded to gain congruence with local norms. China has now been able to 
internalize the norm, because it was no longer ‘foreign’, but adjusted to local circumstances.  
In conclusion, the second criterion is met. China has shaped the international norm to 
fit the domestic requirements and is now assuming a leadership role in unequal relationships. 
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Putting the environment above economic growth  
Firstly, it is clear that the PRC could not be classified as a climate ‘skeptic’ or ‘denialist’ in 
2009. The PRC expressed a fact-based, rational and non-emotional response to climate 
change as such (Jylhä, 2016, p.18). In Xinhua 1 (2009) it is stated that “nowadays [there are] 
already unavoidable influences of climate change” and a paragraph is dedicated to the 
development of greenhouse gas emissions. This shows that, even though China admitted to 
the existence of climate change, the response to tackling climate change did not follow suit.  
 In the 1996 environmental White Paper it was only tacitly accepted that reducing 
carbon emissions would be beneficial to the environment. It was not until the 2008 
environmental White Paper that the topic of climate change was directly addressed. This 
White Paper elaborated on the ways that climate change will affect China in the fields of 
agriculture, forestry, ecosystems, water resources and socio-economic development as a 
whole (State Council of the PRC, 2008).  
 Even tough China was not a climate skeptic, stopping climate change was not a 
priority. In the 2008 environmental White Paper it is stated that the PRC is “taking economic 
development as the core objective”. This is because the legitimacy of the CCP is nowadays 
rooted in economic growth. This would give reason to the argument that the PRC does not 
combat climate change, but instead focuses its attention and resources on economic growth. I 
will therefore now look at China’s compliance on climate related commitments.  
The G20 Research Group has tracked the compliance of G20 members on all 
commitments made from the first summit in 2008 until now. China’s performance is 
measured in three issue areas concerning environmental protection: climate change, fossil fuel 
subsidies and clean energy technology. From 2008 to 2016, 53 politically binding, future-
oriented and collective commitments have been made during the summits in the leaders’ 
name (Warren, 2016, p.1). China has mixed results and considerable variance over time. For 
example, China still provides the highest levels of government fossil fuels subsidies in the 
G20: approximately 80 billion USD (and other 20 billion USD by public finance) (Hsu et al., 
2016 p.107). Per individual member, China scores averages on compliance with a score of 
64%. China belongs to the component group BRICS
6
 with the lowest overall average of only 
54% (other groups are OECD
7
, G7
8
, MIKTA
9
). However, China is leading among its BRICS 
peers (Warren, 2016, p.2). 
                                                        
6 The BRICS group consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
7
 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an intergovernmental 
organization with 35 member states. Its members are considered to be the developed countries.  
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 A trend that can be witnessed is that most members have a better compliance rate on 
commitments with reference to the UNFCCC or green growth. Moreover, it is more facile to 
cooperate in the field of green growth commitment, because these commitments tend to be 
more vague and leave room for interpretation and, therefore, implementation (Warren, 2016, 
pp.7-13).  
In Table 1 the compliance scores China has been assigned in the issues areas of climate 
change, fossil fuel subsidies and clear energy technology over time are given. The general 
guidelines for compliance scoring are as followed: -1 (no progress toward compliance or 
actions counter to compliances), 0 (partial compliance with the stated goals of the 
commitment) and +1 (complete or near complete compliance with the stated goals of the 
commitment) (Kirton et al., 2016, p.26).  
Table 1: China’s compliance performance on climate change, fossil fuel subsidies, and clean 
energy technology (Wang, 2016, p.18).  
1011
 
 
We can see that China has received a score of 1 on clean energy technology, which indicates 
full compliance from 2009 onwards. On fossil fuel subsidies China receives an average score 
of 0, which fluctuating scores between 2010 and 2016. This indicates ‘inability to commit’ or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8
 This is the predecessor of the G20. Exists of countries with high national wealth and high Human 
Development Index (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, US, UK, [EU]).  
9
 MIKTA is an informal partnership between the foreign ministers of Australia, Turkey, Mexico, 
Indonesia and the Republic of Korea. 
10  The empty brackets represent that the issue area was not selected in the compliance reports in the 
respective year and, therefore, no data is available.  
11
 The table by Wang (2016) was not complete, because it did not contain the data of 2016. I have 
added the Compliance Report by the G20 Research Group of the 2016 Hangzhou Summit and have 
recalculated the average scores.  This was the Interim Compliance Report, because the final 
compliance report has not yet been published.  
People’s Republic of 
China 
Climate Change Fossil Fuel 
Subsidies 
Clean Energy 
Technology 
  -1 +1 
2011  +1 +1 
2012 +1 +1  
2013 -1  +1 
2014 0 -1 +1 
2015  0  
2016 (interim) +1 0  
Average Score +0,25 0 +1 
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‘work-in-progress’. Lastly, China receives a score of +0,25 on climate change indicating 
partial compliance with a positive outlook. As stated by Wang (2016, p.17):  
 
“As a proxy, China’s partial compliance with its G20 commitments is not an 
equivalent to China’s climate actions for two reasons. First, the G20 commitments generally 
become stronger annually which indicate that G20 member countries, including China, have 
improved their compliance with climate and energy issues. Secondly, China has taken its own 
strategic approach to climate change and energy development in recent years, which is not 
always in line with G20 commitments.”  
 
All in all, it can be concluded that China is cooperating in the majority of issue areas 
and feels the obligation to comply with UNFCCC commitments. There is, however, micro-
variance visible: the slacking progress on cutting fossil fuel subsidies can be traced back to its 
domestic context. The strong domestic resistance by SOE’s and its employees and the 
domestic development agenda are key explanatory factors for this variance.  
The causal mechanisms behind this shift to put the environment above economic 
growth, needs to be understood as a process in two steps. Firstly, domestic pressures initiated 
the norm diffusion process. Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s increasing international 
journalistic and scholarly evidence showed the growing problems of environmental 
deterioration. The public’s tolerance for environmental related problems started to decrease 
(Li, 2016, pp.51-21). Chinese citizens do not directly vote, but have other effective measures 
to pressure their government. The rise of the Internet and emergence of more liberal 
newspapers are increasing the awareness and opportunities to gain influence on the political 
agenda. Moreover, since social stability is one of the core objectives of the CCP, particularly 
local officials are inclined to address the demands for a greener society (Zheng, Kahn, Sun & 
Luo, 2013, p.62). Moreover, in 2014 the Chinese government received 100.413 letters of 
complaints on environmental problems. Public participation through direct complaint or 
indirect protest has proven to play an important role (Zheng & Shi, 2016, pp.295-301). This 
bottom-up approach of pressure groups targeting local governments is the first step of the 
causal mechanism.  
The second step is decision of the national government to align domestic objectives 
with demands from the public and the international norm. It has long been recognized that the 
double-digit growth was unsustainable, both in economic and environmental terms (Hilton & 
Kerr, 2016, p.51). In the 13
th
 FYP this was phrased as followed: “At the same time, we must 
be soberly aware that China’s development model is inefficient; uneven, uncoordinated, and 
unsustainable development continues to be a prominent problem” (PRC, 2016, pp.12-13). 
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The domestic objectives are achieving a continuance of economic growth (legitimacy) 
and becoming energy independent. “Green development” and innovation have become new 
core values to shift the economy into a sustainable direction (Geall, 2016). This priority 
adjustment can be deducted from the compliance scores of the G20 research group. The issue 
area where China consistently scored full compliance is green growth.  
In conclusion, the third criterion is met. The PRC has strategically chosen to 
internalize the norm based on self-interest by aligning domestic objectives with demands from 
domestic social pressure groups and the international norm on environmental protection. 
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
Conclusion 
This research has shown that the norm of international cooperation in tackling climate change 
at first brought up a lot of resistance in China. During the Copenhagen climate conference 
China was an unwilling partner and reluctant to cooperate internationally. After the discourse 
and policy analysis, I was able to conclude that there is a clear difference in standpoint during 
COP-15 and COP-21. In the last eight years, China has shown a different attitude towards 
international cooperation in combatting climate change.  
In answer to my research question, the following can be concluded: there are three 
PRC norms on international cooperation that did not align with the transnational norm. The 
first norm, the reluctance in giving on sovereignty and working in international institution, 
has been altered by normative change. By a process of social learning, China is now actively 
cooperating within the UNFCCC and has higher compliance scores on commitments made 
during these summits. Moreover, China has for the first time made pledges for a peak year in 
emissions and is subjected itself to international MRV.  
The second norm entails that cooperation needs to take place in unequal relationships 
in which China assumes a leadership role. Because of the strong sense of self-identity and the 
existence of this fundamental local norm, the transnational norm could not be accepted wholly, 
but rather altered to fit the domestic context. The PRC is now positioning itself as the leader 
of developing countries by initiating projects, offering trainings and making investments. 
Moreover, different paths for cooperating with specific country groups are laid out. The norm 
is no longer ‘foreign’ due to a process of localization and China has now internalized the 
norm. 
The third norm entails that economic development is the core objective and that 
environmental protection takes a second place – not in the least because the legitimacy of the 
CCP is rooted in economic growth. However, it has long been recognized that the economic 
growth was unsustainable, both in economic and environmental terms. This is the part where 
it becomes clear that cost-benefit analysis and norm diffusion are two non-excludable entities 
and that norm diffusion therefore cannot fully account for the shift in policy and attitude. The 
PRC has strategically internalized the norm by aligning its domestic objectives (becoming 
energy independent and sustained economic growth) with the transnational norm. This norm 
has not yet been completely diffused. Chins still seems hesitant to stop funding fossil fuels. 
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This is highly correlated with the domestic context: SOEs exert great influence on 
policymaking and are dependent on state funding. However, one could argue that although the 
PRC is dealing with domestic pressures by the SOE’s, the fact that they are funding clean 
energy initiatives could point to a way in which it will eventually circumvent the domestic 
pressures and will continue the process of norm internalization.  
 
Discussion  
Firstly, every discourse and policy analysis has its limitations, because they do not show the 
thinking process of policy makers. Moreover, due to time limitations I chose to analyze 
articles of the two UNFCCC summits that were most exemplary for the shift in the behavior 
and attitude. It could be fruitful to carry out a discourse analysis of all G20 and UNFCCC 
summits and highlight the incremental changes. In addition to this, interviews with Chinese 
policy makers could provide even more insights. 
A second limitation was the diversity and size of the Chinese state. I have now treated 
China as a unitary entity and this does not paint a full picture of the situation. Some provinces 
and province-level municipalities are much more progressive in their environmental policies 
and open to the international system. While I addressed the bottom-up influence of societal 
groups, the internal politics between provinces and the central government might also provide 
some valuable insights in Chinese environmental policy making.  
Thirdly, I contributed to the literature on norm localizing by testing it in a domestic 
setting, as opposed to regional, but this is at the same time the pitfall: the external validity of 
this research is relatively low. It is difficult to extrapolate my findings to compliance behavior 
of other states, because the domestic context will be fundamentally different. However, the 
criteria I have provided for testing norm localization could be used to test for norm diffusion 
of other norms in the PRC, such as Human Rights.  
Lastly, more research should be done on the relationship between the economic and 
domestic interests of the PRC and international cooperation in combatting climate change 
from a constructivist perspective. I have found that most authors use a realist perspective to 
explain China’s behavior in international relations. However, I have found that norm diffusion 
does play and important role and it would be beneficial for international cooperation to 
conduct more research on this topic. As for this research, I have provided a deeper 
understanding of the PRC’s standpoint on climate change and compliance behavior. This will 
help international policy makers and representatives to better comprehend China’s intentions 
and will help predict behavior, possible breaking point and implementation results.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Four articles by Xinhua News Agency: one before and after COP-15 and COP-21 
respectively. All translations are my own.  
Coding system:  
- Responsibility for climate change   
- China’s actions on tackling climate change  
- General information on climate change 
- Difference between developed and developing countries 
- Actions by the developed countries on tackling climate change 
- How international cooperation should take place 
- How climate change should be tackled 
- How China is viewed by others 
- China as leader of others  
 
Article 1: COP 15. Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Xinhua News Agency Chinese News (Simplified)  
By: Huang Kun  (07-12-2009) 
（应对气候变化）短评：发达国家理应为
气候变化“埋单” 
 
(Answering to climate change) Short 
comment: developed countries should “pay 
the bill” for climate change  
 
“请问您认为应对气候变化需要多少钱？
”“这些资金应该如何提供？”在６日下午
的哥本哈根气候变化大会会前新闻发布会
上，各国记者连番问起“钱”的问题，谁该
为气候变化“埋单”受到高度关注。 
 
“May I ask something, how much money do 
you think is needed for answering to climate 
change?” “How should these funds be 
provided?” On the press conference on the 
afternoon of the 6
th
 before the Copenhagen 
Climate Change Convention, journalists from 
different countries repeatedly asked the 
“money” questions, who should received a 
high degree of attention to “pay the bill” for 
climate change.  
《联合国气候变化框架公约》执行秘书伊
福·德布尔回答说，为帮助有关国家适应
目前已经无法避免的气候变化影响，今后
The United National Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Executive 
Secretary Yvo De Boer answered and said, to 
help concerned countries adapt to the 
nowadays already unavoidable influences of 
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３年每年至少需要１００亿美元，长期来
看更是需要按千亿美元计算的钜额资金。  
 
climate change. After today for three years, 
every year, at least 10 billion USD is needed, 
in the long run is needed a huge amount on 
money of a trillion USD based on 
calculations.  
这些钱由谁来掏？德布尔明确提到欧盟、
日本和美国的名字，这些经济最发达的国
家和地区，不仅有责任应对气候变化，与
广大发展中国家相比也更有能力提供资金
。 
 
Out of whom is this money going to be 
dredged?  De Boer explicitly mentioned the 
names of the European Union, Japan en the 
US, these are the countries and regions with 
the most developed economies, they do not 
only have the responsibility to respond to 
climate change, but also have more 
capability in providing funds in comparison 
with the vast majority of developing 
countries.  
实际上，上述问题的原则性答案早已明确
。《联合国气候变化框架公约》及其《京
都议定书》都说明了发达国家应该提供资
金帮助发展中国家应对气候变化。原因很
简单，工业革命以来发达国家排放了大量
温室气体，是气候变化问题的主要责任者
。 
 
In fact, the principled answer to the above-
mentioned questions has already for a long 
been clear. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol both illustrated that developed 
countries should provide funds to help 
countries in development answer to climate 
change. The reason is very simple, from the 
Industrial Revolution onwards the developed 
countries have emitted large quantities of 
greenhouse gasses, this is the main thing to 
blame for the problem of climate change.  
研究数据显示，从１８世纪西方工业革命
到１９５０年，在人类燃烧化石燃料释放
的二氧化碳总量中，发达国家的排放占了
９５％。从１９５０年到２０００年的５
０年中，发达国家的排放量仍占总排放量
的７７％。即便在今天，占世界人口约２
２％的发达国家仍消耗著全球７０％以上
的能源，排放５０％以上的温室气体。多
数发达国家人均温室气体排放量远远高于
世界平均水准。而发展中国家多数是气候
变化的受害者，一些小岛国甚至可能因此
遭受“没顶”之灾。 
 
Research data shows that, from the 18
th
 
century Western Industrial Revolution until 
the year 1950, of the total amount of carbon 
dioxide that was released by mankind 
burning fossil fuel, developed countries 
emitted 95% of it. In the 50 years from 1950 
until 2000, the amount emitted by developed 
countries still makes up 77% of the total 
amount emitted. Even today, the developed 
countries that make up approximately 22% of 
the world population are still consuming 
more than 70% of the world’s energy and 
emitting more than 50% of the world 
greenhouse gasses. The per capita quantity of 
greenhouse gas emissions of the majority of 
the developed countries is far higher than the 
average of the world. And developing 
countries are mostly the victim of climate 
change, and some small island states may 
even because of the disaster of ‘no top’ 
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suffer.  
在道义的压力下，发达国家近来虽然口头
上表示愿意出钱帮助发展中国家应对气候
变化，但在实际掏钱时却都扭扭捏捏，一
直没有拿出让国际社会满意的资金方案。 
 
Under the pressure of morality, developed 
countries recently, even though they have 
orally expressed the desire to give money to 
help countries in development to answer to 
climate change, but in reality, when money 
needs to be taken out, yet all are bashful, and 
continuously they have not taken out funding 
programs that make the international 
community feel satisfied.  
一些发达国家甚至无视“共同但有区别的
责任”原则，企图让发展中国家变相为气
候变化“埋单”，要求发展中国家也强制减
排。发展中国家代表之一的东南亚国家联
盟（简称东盟）在哥本哈根气候变化大会
前专门发表声明，重申对发展的正当要求
，并敦促发达国家提供资金应对气候变化
。 
 
Some developed countries even ignore the 
principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” and attempt to make the 
countries in development covertly “pay the 
bill” for climate change. An Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations’ (abbreviated to: 
ASEAN) specialist, one of the 
representatives of developing countries, 
before the Copenhagen Conference on 
Climate Change, expressed and explained, 
reaffirmed the legitimate demand for 
development and urged development 
countries to provide funding to answer 
climate change.  
地球是一个大家庭，一些成员在先行致富
的同时损坏了整个家庭居住的“大房子”，
那么，出钱维修难道不是略有良知的成员
都应该做的事情吗？（完） 
 
The earth is one big family, some member 
firstly went and become rich and at the same 
time damaged “the big house” in which the 
whole family lives, is then paying to repair 
not a thing that all members that have a little 
intuitive knowledge should do? (The end) 
 
 
 
Article 2: COP 15. Copenhagen, Denmark.  
Xinhua News Agency Chinese News (Simplified)  
By: Wang Zhouzhou (23-12-2009) 
(应对气候变化）综合消息：国际社会持
续关注哥本哈根气候大会及《哥本哈根协
议》 
(In answer to climate change) 
Comprehensive analysis: the international 
community continues to follow with interest 
the Copenhagen Climate Conference and 
‘Copenhagen Agreement’  
新华社北京１２月２３日电综合新华社记
Xinhua News Agency in Beijing on the 23
rd
 
of December publishes a report by Xinhua 
News Agency foreign-based reporter: United 
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者驻外报道：联合国气候变化大会经过各
方艰苦磋商和共同努力，最后发表了《哥
本哈根协议》。尽管大会已于１９日闭幕
，但国际社会连日来仍持续关注气候变化
问题，不断就相关话题发表看法。 
 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, through hard consultation and 
collaboration by all parties, finally released 
the ‘Copenhagen Accord’. Although the big 
meeting already ended at the 19
th
, but the 
international community continues for days 
on end to remain closely following the 
problem of climate change, continuously 
publishing viewpoints on related issues.  
第６４届联合国大会主席阿裏·图裏基２
２日说，《哥本哈根协议》的达成是联合
国气候变化大会取得进展的重要标志。尽
管有些国家对哥本哈根会议的成果不太满
意，但是“我们必须以现实的态度来看待
会议的成果”，这是各方经过艰苦谈判取
得的成果，“确实具有积极意义”。 
Chairman of the 64
th
 United National 
General Assembly Ali Toryki said on the 
22
nd
: the accomplishment of the Copenhagen 
Agreement is an important symbol of the 
achieved progress of the United Nations 
Climate Change Conference. Although some 
countries were not too satisfied with the 
results of the Copenhagen Conference, “we 
must look at the results of the Conference 
with a realistic point of view”, this is 
obtained result through rough negotiations by 
all parties, “it really has a positive meaning”.    
国际能源机构２２日发表公报，对《哥本
哈根协议》的达成表示欢迎，称该协议为
下一步的气候变化谈判提供了指导。公报
说，《哥本哈根协议》呼吁发达国家作出
承诺，从财政上支持发展中国家适应气候
变化。国际能源机构估计，发展中国家每
年约需２０００亿美元的投资，才能在２
０２０年前建立起一套对碳依赖相对较小
的能源体系，而发达国家在协议中承诺的
资金援助将有助于实现这一目标。 
 
The International Energy Agency issued a 
communiqué on the 22
nd
; it expressed 
welcome for the reached agreement of the 
Copenhagen Accord, called the before 
mentioned agreement as having provided 
guidance for the next step in climate 
negotiations. The communiqué stated: The 
Climate Agreement calls on developed 
countries to promise to start undertaking 
support, on a financial level, for countries in 
development to adjust to climate change. The 
International Energy Agency estimates 
countries in development every year need 
approximately 200 billion USD in 
investments, only to be able to before 2020 
to establish a series of energy systems that 
relies relatively little on carbon, and 
developed countries in the Agreement 
promised to undertake fund support to 
contribute to the realization of this one goal.  
代表巴西参加哥本哈根气候变化谈判的迪
尔玛·罗塞芙表示，哥本哈根大会是解决
气候问题的重要途径。她说，哥本哈根大
会期间，中国、印度、南非和巴西代表举
The Brazil delegate to the Copenhagen 
Climate Change Negotiations Dilma 
Rousseff stated that the Copenhagen 
Conference is an important channel to 
solving the problem of climate change. She 
said that during the Copenhagen Conference 
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行的“基础四国”会谈“富有成效”，四国互
相尊重，本着解决气候问题的目的交换意
见，中国提出了积极的减排目标。 
the ‘fundamental four countries’ talks that 
the delegates of China, India, South Africa 
and Brazil organized were full of results, the 
four countries respect each other, and in the 
light of the objective of solving the problem 
of climate change, they exchanged visions, 
China brought up proactive carbon reduction 
goals.  
美国进步中心高级政策分析师黄立安认为
，《哥本哈根协议》至少有三个原因令人
乐观：中国、印度等主要发展中国家首次
在国际协议中承诺采取减缓行动；协议对
“透明度”等焦点问题作出规定；协议规定
了发达国家要承担向发展中国家、特别是
受气候变化影响最严重的国家以及穷国提
供财政援助的义务。他表示，中国在哥本
哈根大会期间发挥了积极的、建设性作用
。例如，中国一直大力推动发达国家立即
向小岛国以及最不发达国家等最易受气候
变化影响的发展中国家提供财政援助。 
 
The senior policy analyst of the American 
Progress Center Huang Li’An stated that the 
‘Copenhagen Agreement’ has at least three 
reasons to make people feel optimistic: 
China, India etc. namely countries in 
development for the first time in an 
international agreements promised to adopt 
actions of slowing down: the agreement put 
out guidelines for the focus point problems 
of transparency enz: the agreement stipulated 
that developed countries must bear the 
obligation for provide assistance to countries 
in development, especially the countries that 
will receive the most impact by climate 
change, and to poor countries. He expressed 
that China, during the Copenhagen 
Conference, exhibited a function that was 
proactive and constructive. For instance, 
China continuously with vigor pushes 
developed countries to immediately provide 
financial assistance towards countries in 
development that will most easily be 
influenced by climate change, small island 
states and the least development countries et 
cetera. 
针对日前有关中国“劫持”哥本哈根气候变
化大会谈判进程的言论，挪威气候研究中
心主任克努特·阿尔夫桑说，这一说法“有
失公允”。在应对气候变化方面，“中国做
得比美国好多了”。他认为，中国宣布的
温室气体减排目标是“一个雄心勃勃的目
标”，中国在建设富足社会的同时实现减
少排放，“把矛头指向中国是不对的”。 
In response to the remarks from a few days 
ago in relation to China ‘hijacking’ the 
process of the negotiations from the 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, 
the head research director of the Norwegian 
Center for International Climate and 
Environmental, Knut Alfsen, said that this 
statement fails in ‘fairness’. At the respect of 
dealing with climate change “China has done 
much better when compared to the United 
States”. He thinks that the greenhouse gas 
reduction objective that China declared is “a 
very ambitious objective”, and that while 
China is busy building an affluent society, 
realizes reducing emission: “it is not right to 
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point to China”.  
挪威环境与外援大臣埃裏克·索尔海姆日
前也表示，哥本哈根气候变化大会未能达
成具有约束力的协议，不能归咎于中国。
（完） 
The Norwegian Foreign Aid and 
Environment Minister, Eric Solheim, has 
also expressed the other day that [the fact 
that the] Copenhagen Climate Conference 
failed to reach an agreement with binding 
force, cannot be attributed to China. (The 
end)  
 
 
 
 
Article 3: COP 21. Paris, France.  
Xinhua News Agency Chinese News (Simplified)  
By: Zhang Lin (29-11-2015) 
（巴黎气候变化大会）综合消息：国际社
会赞扬中国应对气候变化的努力 
(Paris Climate Change Conference) 
Comprehensive news: The international 
community praises China for its efforts in 
answering to climate change  
新华社北京１１月２９日电综合新华社驻
外记者报道：世界自然基金会下属的“全
球气候与能源倡议”负责人萨曼莎·史密斯
日前在接受新华社记者采访时表示，中国
在全球应对气候变化行动中的努力值得赞
扬。法国外交部长法比尤斯２８日表示，
中国正在采取的行动为各方在巴黎达成新
的全球气候协议增加积极信号。 
On 29/11 the Xinhua News Agency in 
Beijing published a comprehensive report by 
Xinhua News Agency Foreign Affairs 
reporter: Sam Smith, leader of the Climate 
and Energy Initiative by World Wide Fund 
(WWF) recently stated during an interview 
by a Xinhua News Agency reporter, that the 
efforts of China in the global response to 
climate change are worth to be praised. The 
French foreign minister [Laurent] Fabius 
stated on the 28
th
 that the actions that China 
is in the process of taking increase the 
positive signals for all parties in Paris to 
accomplish a new global climate agreement.   
巴黎气候变化大会将于１１月３０日至１
２月１１日召开，史密斯将作为非政府组
织代表出席大会。她认为在巴黎达成协定
“非常有可能”，因为尽管目前各国对协议
内容的要求还不尽相同，但几乎所有国家
都希望达成某种形式的协议。 
The Paris Climate Change Convention will 
take place from 30/11 to 11/12, and Smith 
will act as the representative of non-
governmental organizations to attend the 
meeting. She believes that reaching an 
agreement in Paris “is very likely”, because, 
despite that currently the respective 
countries’ demand are not exactly the same 
on the contents of the agreement, but almost 
all countries want to reach some form of 
agreement.  
史密斯对中国限制温室气体排放及坚持《 Smith expressed praise that China puts 
restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions as 
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联合国 气候变化框架公约》（下称《公约
》）中提出的“共同但有区别的责任”原则
表示赞赏。她说，中国虽然是发展中国家
，但在应对气候变化方面通过“国家自主
贡献”等方式作出了巨大的承诺，还宣布
将出资２００亿元人民币建立“中国气候
变化南南合作基金”。 
well as upholds the principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities” that was 
stated in the UNFCCC (hereafter referred to 
as “the Convention”). She states that China, 
although it is a developing country, has put 
forward great commitments in respect to 
answering to climate change, through ways 
such as the “country’s own contributions”, 
and also announced to invest 20 billion yuan 
to establish the “China Climate Change 
South-South Cooperation Fund”.   
反观发达国家，虽然作出了到２０２０年
每年向发展中国家提供１０００亿美元气
候援助的承诺，但史密斯表示目前这个承
诺与落实之间还存在巨大差距。她认为，
资金问题将是巴黎气候谈判中的首要挑战
。 
In contrast, the developed countries, even 
though they put forward the commitment 
until 2020 to annually provide 1000 billion 
USD for countries in development for 
climate aid, Smith stated that currently there 
still exists a huge cap between the promises 
and the implementation. She believes that the 
funding issue will be the main challenge 
during the Paris Climate negotiations.  
史密斯说，在应对气候变化方面，一个可
喜的进展是关于全球变暖是否存在的争议
已经减少，能源领域也出现由化石燃料向
可再生能源转变的革命性趋势。她说，以
中国、印度为代表的发展中国家在利用可
再生能源方面也作出了重要贡献。 
Smith said, in respect to answer to climate 
change, a heart-warming progress is that the 
controversy has already been decreased on 
whether global warming exists or not. The 
energy sector also seems to have a 
revolutionary trend to change from fossil 
fuels to renewable energy. She said, taking 
China and India as representing the 
developing countries, have, in respect to 
using renewable energy also showed 
important contributions.  
法国外交部长、巴黎气候变化大会主席法
比尤斯２８日表示，中国正在采取的行动
为各方在巴黎达成新的全球气候协议增加
积极信号。 
The French Foreign Minister and the Paris 
Climate Change Convention President, 
[Laurent] Fabius states on the 28
th
 that the 
actions that China is in the process of taking 
increase the positive signals for all parties in 
Paris to accomplish a new global climate 
agreement.  
法比尤斯说，他担任法国外长后曾１１次
访华。在访华时，他真实地看到，中国正
坚定地采取应对气候变化行动。 
Fabius said that after he was the French 
Foreign Minister, he made 11 state visits to 
China. During these visits, he really saw that 
China was taking firm action to answer to 
climate change.  
“中国称之为‘生态文明’，”法比尤斯说， “China calls it an “ecological civilization””, 
said [Laurent] Fabius, even though currently 
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尽管目前各方围绕气候变化新协议谈判在
责任区分、资金、承诺修改等方面仍有众
多分歧，但积极信号不断显现。中国采取
的行动便是其中之一。 
all parties center on the negotiations of the 
new agreement on climate change, there are 
still numerous differences in the fields of 
distinguishing response, funding and the 
altering of commitments among other things, 
positive signals are continuing to appear. The 
action that China is taking is one of them.  
 
他说，法中两国本月初发表了一份联合声
明，其中涉及有关气候协议谈判的一些建
议，希望这些建议能被更多国家接受。 
He states that China and France issues a joint 
statement earlier this month, with in it a 
couple of recommendations that relate to the 
negotiations of the climate agreement, and 
that the hopes that these recommendations 
can be accepted by even more countries.  
《公约》秘书处执行秘书菲格雷斯２８日
表示，目前许多国家向联合国提交了自己
的减排计划，在大会前，应对气候变化行
动得到如此多国家的参与已经是一种成功
。（完） 
 
The executive secretary of the Convention, 
Figueres, said on the 28
th
 that currently many 
countries have submitted their own plans on 
reducing carbon emissions to the United 
Nations and, before the Conference, that the 
actions in answering to climate change has 
reached the joining of more countries in this 
way is already a success. (The End) 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 4: COP 21. Paris, France.  
Xinhua News Agency Chinese News (Simplified)  
By: Yang Jun (14-12-2015) 
(巴黎气候变化大会）特稿：《巴黎协定
》背后的中国智慧与力量 
(Paris Climate Change Conference) Feature: 
China’s wisdom and strength behind the 
Paris Agreement  
世界目光聚焦巴黎。当地时间１２日晚，
有关２０２０年后全球应对气候变化行动
安排的《巴黎协定》终于破壳而出。 
De sight of the world is focused on Paris. 
Local time in the evening of the 12
th
, the 
Paris Agreement, that plans in detail the 
action against climate change in relation to 
the world after 2020, has finally broken its’ 
shell and come out. 
巴黎气候变化大会，１３天、近２００个
缔约方，催生《巴黎协定》的谈判密集而
艰苦。作为全球应对气候变化事业的积极
参与者，中国方案、中国行动与中国智慧
The Paris Climate Change Conference, 13 
days, nearly 200 parties, intensive and hard 
negotiates that birthed the “Paris 
Agreement”. As an active participant in the 
global response to climate change 
undertakings, China’s case, China’s actions 
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，为大会成功作出不可替代的贡献。 and wisdom make a contribution to the 
results of the conference that cannot be 
replaced.  
(小标题） 
贡献中国智慧 
(Subheading)  
Contributions and China’s wisdom 
一份成功的国际协议既要解决当下矛盾，
也要引领未来。正基于此，中国国家主席
习近平在参加巴黎气候变化大会时对巴黎
协定提出了四点建议：有利于实现公约目
标，引领绿色发展；有利于凝聚全球力量
，鼓励广泛参与；有利于加大投入，强化
行动保障；有利于照顾各国国情，讲求务
实有效。 
A successful international conference must 
solve both the current contradiction and must 
also lead the future. Precisely based on this, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping when attending 
the Paris Climate Change Conference 
brought forth four recommendations to the 
Paris Agreement: it is beneficial to realize 
joint pledge goals, show the way in Green 
Growth; it is beneficial to aggregate the 
forces of the whole world and encourage 
broad participation; it is beneficial to 
increase investments, strengthen action 
guarantees; it is beneficial to pay attention to 
the specific conditions of every county, to be 
particular, pragmatic and effective.  
这些建议既立足当下，又面向未来，既坚
持原则，又体现灵活，既勾勒出聚同化异
、相向而行的现实路径，也包含著标本兼
治、绿色发展的长远谋划，因而得到广泛
支持和赞同。 
Those proposals do not only have a foothold 
on the present, but are also future-oriented. 
They do not only hold on to the principles, 
but also embody flexibility. They do not only 
outline ‘poly-assimilation’ and the actual 
path of going in opposite directions, but also 
tackling root causes simultaneously and the 
long-term plan of green growth. And, 
therefore, receive broad support and 
approval.  
“巴黎大会应该摈弃‘零和博弈’狭隘思维，
推动各国尤其是发达国家多一点共享、多
一点担当，实现互惠共赢。”习近平主席
的讲话，为国际社会深入思考和探索未来
全球治理模式、推动人类命运共同体建设
贡献了中国智慧。 
The Paris Conference should abandon the 
narrow-minded view of a ‘zero-sum game’, 
and promote that every country, especially 
the developed countries share a little bit more 
and undertake a little bit more, to realize 
mutual benefit and win-win. The speech of 
president Xi Jinping, for the international 
community to thoroughly ponder and explore 
manners for future global governance and to 
promote the construction of a human destiny 
community, has contributed to Chinese 
wisdom.   
作为世界最大的发展中国家，中国也正用 As the world biggest country in 
 40 
自己的行动与智慧，为其他发展中国家“
带路”——探索一个可资借鉴的绿色发展
模式，助力全球应对气候变化和向生态文
明转型。 
development, China is also currently using 
its own actions and wisdom to act as a guide 
for other countries in development
12
 - to 
explore a green growth model that can be 
used as reference to help the global response 
to the climate change and towards an 
ecologically civilized transformation. 
中国经济快速发展，人民生活发生了深刻
变化，但也付出了资源环境方面的代价。
在中国这片土地上，既有天人合一、道法
自然等思想积淀，更有“绿水青山就是金
山银山”等认识上的飞跃。  
The Chinese economy has developed rapidly, 
profound changes have taken place in 
people’s lives, but also a price in respect to 
natural resources and the environment has 
been paid. In this piece of land in China, 
exists the theory that man is an integral part 
of nature and exists the accumulated wisdom 
of Taoist and other natural thought. 
Furthermore, there is a leap in the knowledge 
that “nature is the true treasure”13  
(小标题） 
为全球做表率 
(Subheading)  
To set an example for the world  
法国作家雨果说：“最大的决心会产生最
高的智慧。”中国正是以最大的决心、最
高的智慧走绿色发展之路： 
The French writer [Victor] Hugo said: “the 
biggest determination shall produce the 
highest wisdom”. China is currently taking 
the biggest determination and highest 
wisdom to talk the path of green growth.  
“十二五”期间，中国以前所未有、全球罕
见的力度，治理污染保护生态环境。如今
，中国已是世界节能和利用新能源、可再
生能源第一大国。 
During the “12th Five-Year Plan”, China, by 
unprecedented and globally rare efforts, 
brought pollution under control to protect the 
ecological environment. Nowadays, China is 
already the first power in global energy 
saving, new energy resources and renewable 
energy resources.  
面向未来，中国将把生态文明建设作为“
十三五”规划重要内容，落实创新、协调
、绿色、开放、共享的发展理念，通过科
技创新和体制机制创新，实施优化产业结
构、构建低碳能源体系、发展绿色建筑和
Looking at the future, China will take the 
ecological civilized construction as the most 
important content of the 13
th
 Five-Year Plan. 
To implement a development vision that is 
innovative, harmonized, green, open-minded 
and shared, by means of innovation in 
science and technology and innovation in 
institutional mechanisms, to implement a set 
                                                        
12
 This is a reference to the new Silk Road: the One Belt One Road initiative [一带一路] 
13 This phrase combined two sayings: ‘green waters and fresh mountains’ (绿水青山) 
are equal to ‘gold mountains and silver mountains’ (金山银山) 
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低碳交通、建立全国碳排放交易市场等一
系列政策措施，形成人和自然和谐发展现
代化建设新格局。 
of policy measures to optimize the industrial 
structure, to construct a energy system low 
on carbon, to develop green buildings and 
low-carbon transport, to establish a national 
carbon emission exchange et cetera and to 
form a new modernized and constructive 
pattern of harmonious development between 
man and nature.  
中国在巴黎大会召开前提交的国家自主贡
献文件中，提出将于２０３０年左右使二
氧化碳排放达到峰值，并争取尽早实现，
２０３０年单位国内生产总值二氧化碳排
放比２００５年下降６０％到６５％，非
化石能源占一次能源消费比重达到２０％
左右，森林蓄积量比２００５年增加４５
亿立方米左右。 
In the country’s self-contribution document 
submitted before the convocation of the Paris 
Conference, China put forward that in 
approximately 2030 it would reach the peak 
in carbon dioxide emissions and will strive to 
realize this as early as possible, in 2030 
carbon dioxide emission (per unit?) in 
comparison to 2005 will have decreased 
ranging from 60 to 65%, non-fossil energy 
resources take up a proportion of 
approximately 20% in primary energy 
consumption, the volume of forest reserves 
will increase by 4.5 billion cubic meters.  
这些做法获得了国际社会的好评。《联合
国气候变化框架公约》秘书处执行秘书克
裏斯蒂娜·菲格雷斯不久前在一个记者会
上回答“哪个国家的应对气候变化行动可
称榜样”时点名提到了中国。她说，中国
采取了“非常令人印象深刻的”行动，中国
在对待气候变化问题上“非常非常认真”。 
These ways of doing things has received the 
praise of the international community. The 
executive secretary of “The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change”, 
Christina Figueres, answered, when she was 
at a press conference not long ago: “which 
country’s answer to climate change action 
should be called an example” and she 
mentioned China. She said that China has 
adopted action “that really gives people a 
profound impression”. China, in the matter of 
the approach to the problem of climate 
change,  “is taking it very, very seriously”.  
除此之外，中国还为南南气候合作增添动
力。在今年９月宣布设立中国气候变化南
南合作基金的基础上，习近平主席在巴黎
大会上进一步宣布，２０１６年将启动在
发展中国家开展１０个低碳示范区、１０
０个减缓和适应气候变化项目及１０００
个应对气候变化培训名额的合作项目。中
国以自己的实际行动支持发展中国家提高
In addition to this, China is also for the 
South-South climate cooperation adding 
motive power. On the basis of the announce 
in September this year to establish the China 
South-South Cooperation fund, president Xi 
Jinping went at the Paris Conference one step 
further and announced cooperation programs 
that in 2016 will be launched, in developing 
countries there will be launched ten low-
carbon demonstrations areas, 100 slow-down 
and adapting to climate change programs and 
1000 training places on climate change. 
China is using its own practical actions to 
 42 
应对气候变化能力，敦促发达国家向发展
中国家提供更多的技术和资金支持，进而
推动气候变化全球行动的进程。 
support developing countries to raise their 
capabilities in answering to climate change 
and urges developed countries to provide 
even more technology and financial support 
for developing countries, and then promotes 
the process of global action against climate 
change.  
(小标题） 
凝聚各方共识 
(Subheading) 
Gathering the common understanding of all 
parties. 
巴黎气候变化大会具有里程碑意义。为推
动全球携手共进，凝聚各方共识，中国作
出了自己的努力。 
The Paris Climate Change Conference is a 
milestone. To promote the world joining 
hands and moving forward, to aggregate 
consensus of all parties, China has made its 
own efforts.  
中国国家气候变化专家委员会副主任何建
坤介绍说，巴黎大会前，中国与美国、法
国、印度、巴西等主要经济体分别发表了
应对气候变化的多个联合声明，气候谈判
中的法律约束力、资金、力度等焦点问题
在这些联合声明中都有描述，这为巴黎大
会的成功奠定了基础。 
He Jiankun, deputy director of the China 
National Climate Change Experts 
Committee, introduced and said, before the 
Paris Conference, that China and the US, 
France, India, Brazil, the major economies 
have separately issued multiple joint 
statements with responses to climate change. 
The key issues of intensity, capital, legal 
binding during climate negotiations had all 
been described in these joint statements; this 
established a basis for the success of the 
Paris Conference.  
大会伊始，习近平主席同其他与会领导人
坦诚、务实沟通协调，引导各方着眼大局
、坚定信心、相向而行，最大程度凝聚共
识。对各方关切的问题，习近平主席强调
共同但有区别的责任这一基本原则依然有
效，同时应推进合作共赢，各尽其能共同
应对挑战，发达国家尤其应切实履行向发
展中国家提供资金和技术转让的义务。这
些主张巩固了应对气候变化的国际合作基
石。 
At beginning of the conference, President Xi 
Jinping together with other leaders that 
participated in the conference communicated 
openly and pragmatically, led all parties to 
concentrate on the overall situation, 
strengthen confidence and to move together, 
to harmonize the greatest degree of 
aggregated consensus. In regards to all 
parties’ concerns, President Xi Jinping 
emphasized that the guiding principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibility” 
was still valid and at the same time promised 
to promote cooperation and win-win, that all 
respectively should export their capabilities 
to answer the challenges together, that 
developed countries, in particular, must 
conscientiously fulfill the task of providing 
funds and technology transfers to countries in 
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development. These propositions have 
strengthened the cornerstone of international 
cooperation in answering climate change.  
在大会闭幕前夕，习近平主席还与美国总
统奥巴马通电话，表达了达成协定的强烈
政治意愿。大会期间，中方团队本着负责
任、合作精神和建设性态度参与谈判，为
促成《巴黎协定》达成作出了重要贡献。 
On the eve of the closing of the Conference, 
President Xi Jinping also called with 
President Obama of the United States and 
expressed the strong political desire to reach 
agreements. During the Conference, the 
Chinese team, in line with responsibility, the 
spirit of cooperation and a constructive 
attitude participated in the negotiations, in 
order to help to bring about the 
accomplishment of the “Paris Agreement” 
has brought about important contributions.  
中国气候变化事务特别代表解振华说，本
次大会上，在与各国共同努力的过程中，
中国为推动达成协定作出了建设性的贡献
。中国始终坚持协定是落实《联合国气候
变化框架公约》、加强行动的阶段性成果
，坚持“共同但有区别的责任”原则，最终
达成的协定也体现了发达国家和发展中国
家的区分。（完） 
Xie Zhenhua, China’s Climate Change 
Special Representative said that during this 
conference, during the process of shared 
efforts with each individual country, China 
has, in order to promote the reaching of an 
agreement, made a constructive contribution. 
China has, from beginning to end, upheld 
that the agreement is fulfilling the “United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change” and strengthening the step-by-step 
achievements of the actions and China has 
adhered to the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility’. The final 
agreed upon agreement also embodies the 
distinction between developed and 
developing countries. (The end) 
 
